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In this paper we propose a measure of technological progress which is based on
the information embedded in standard input{output tables. Well known duality
properties enables one to establish a connection between the quantities necessary
as inputs and the associated output and some auxiliary prices (like the wage-prot
curves). We claim that properly tailored wage-prot frontiers may provide a basis
for the measurement of technological progress. But the computation of these wage-
prot frontiers is not trivial.
A brute force algorithm for the computation of the wage-prot frontiers has
high combinatorial complexity that would make its precise computation intractable.
But thanks to an ecient algorithm that we have been able to devise we can now
compute it. We consider this to be an important and original contribution. Here
we present and apply this algorithm. Due to this improvement we can now use
these wage-prot frontiers as benchmarks against which to measure technological
progress: two new indices have been dened.
These new tools have have been applied to the OECD input{output data 1970{
2005 and the reslts are presented here.
Keywords: Technological Change, Convergence, Input{output analysis, Tech-
nological Frontier, Computational Techniques
JEL classications: C61, C63, C67, O471 Introduction
In this paper we propose a measure of technological progress which is based
on the standard input{output tables. We consider the specic individual
country combinations of inputs as representing a specic method of produc-
tion which is implemented to produce an individual output.
Due to well known duality properties we establish a connection with
the quantities necessary as inputs and the associated output and the wage-
prot curve. Extending the work by Bruno (1969) we dene and interpret
the outer envelope of all the possible wage-prots curves as the wage-prot
frontier. We use this wage-prot frontier as a benchmark against which to
measure technological progress. Hence, in the context of this paper wage-
prot frontier and the technological-frontier are dual with each-others.
Hence, we will assume that technological progress is represented as a
change in the dierent methods { as it appears from the information em-
bedded in the input{output tables. By comparison between country specic
input{output tables we will be able to construct a set of discrete methods
of productions 1. In heterogeneous production whether a new technique is
superior with respect to previous one would depend also on the prices of the
other inputs and hence also on the production methods available for their
production. Hence the duality between quantities and prices is inevitably
of essential importance.
In Section 2 we will review the relation existing between wage-prot
frontier the factor-price frontier, the optimal-transformation-frontier and
claim their duality. In Section 3 we will dene the technological frontier as
the outer envelope computed from all the possible wage-prot curves. The
mathematical notion of an envelope is conceptually straightforward, but the
brute force algorithm associated with the computation of such an envelope
is for every single point computationally infeasible. Thanks to an ecient
algorithm which exploits a result by Bharadwaj (1970) that we have been
able to devise, we can compute several versions of the wage-prot frontier.
This algorithm is described in Section 4.
The new properly tailored wage-prot frontiers are then used to compute
two new indices of technological progress. These indices are dened in Sec-
tion 5. The OECD data set is described in Section 6 and in the Appendix A.
In Section 7 the results of the computations are presented. Section 8 sum-
marizes the main ndings, while Section 9 concludes the paper. Appendix
B reports additional results.
1As observed, among others, by Bruno (1969, p. 51) "any neo-classical technology
could be simulated by a 'very dense' spectrum of discrete techniques". Hence, as we will
see below 3 we can establish a relationship which could be a fairly unproblematic one (or
one satisfactory w.r.t. the current state of the art)
32 Technological Progress and the Quantity{Price
Dualities
Here we base our analysis on input-output models. We will follow stan-
dard assumptions and assume that there are dierent production methods
(activities) available for the production of a single output. These methods
are extracted from the set of available input-output tables. We will assume













where: i = 1;:::;n;j = 1;:::;n; zi = 1;:::;si; and a
zi
ij 2 Q. si is the
number of available methods for the production of good i and n is the
number of goods.
The set of methods for the production of good i can be represented in
matrix notation as:







































Obviously the cardinality ti of the above set of methods can be very
large and subsets of the above methods can have in principle a great variety
of topological properties. For example, subsets of the above methods can
be such as to fulll standard neoclassical properties or such as to contradict
them. After a moment of reection one can see that the above set of discrete
methods can approximate a exible coecients production function as well
as a x coecients production function. It all depends on the numerosity
and on the structure of these alternative methods. As correctly pointed out
by Bruno (1969, p. 51) "any neo-classical technology could be simulated by a
'very dense' spectrum of discrete techniques". In essence whether the overall
production system approximates a neoclassical production function depends
on the actual structure of .
The set of all the available methods is given by the following set of
activities  = f(:;:;1) [ (:;:;2)::: [ (:;:;ti):::;(:;:;n)g.2. Hence an
2Alternatively one can see  as a multiple dimensional array whose maximum number
of rows is given by maxfs1;s2;:::;si;:::;sng, the number of columns is n+2 (the n inputs,
labour and output) and the number of metrices which is equal to the number of goods.
Each matrix (:;:;i) contains information about all the possible discrete methods. The
users of Matlab and/or Mathematica will be familiar of the notation and of the structure
presented here
4n-commodities output vector can be generated by using one combination of
the methods which belongs to set . There are a total s =
Qn
i=1 si of these
combinations. Given one of these combinations,  z = [ z1;  z2;:::;  zn]0, we have









































































XA z;XL z 7! XB z (2.3)
Where X is a semipositive diagonal matrix which represents the intensity
of the utilization of the methods used (the activity levels). The system is
dened as being productive for all those cases in which A, B and X. is such
that e0(XB   XA)  0, where e is the unit or summation vector.
For a productive system and for a given endowment of the factors of pro-
duction, we can construct the economy n{dimensional production possibility
frontier.3
Moreover, there exist exchange rates, i.e. prices, that would assure the
system to be productive also for the periods to come.
(I + R)XA zp + XL zw = XB zp (2.4)
where I is the nxn identity matrix and R is a diagonal nxn matrix where
each diagonal element represents a prot rate, rii.
For a given matrix R and uniform wage rate w there exists a price vector
p which would allow the system to be productive also the subsequent period.
p z = [XB z   (I + R)XA z] 1XL zw (2.5)
An important result is that the re-proportion matrix X is in-inuent for
the determination of the price vector p
p z = [B z   (I + R)A z] 1L zw (2.6)
Equations 2.5 2.6 encapsulate the very important result known as the non-
substitution-theorem which is the fact that the relative prices for a given
3Moreover, once a proper subset of B is dened as being consumption goods one can
construct the n-dimensional optimal transformation frontier which is the "...dynamic
analog of an economy's production possibility frontier, namely the locus of maximal com-
binations of the per capita consumption and the rates of growth of the various capital goods
(Bruno, 1969, p.39)". The dynamic characterization of growth and/or of change is given
by the sequence fXt;Xt+1; ;XTgg from where individual rates of growth, gi, can be
derived
5system (XA z;XL z;XB z) are independent of the intensities of the dierent
activities, X 4
Once the choice of a num eraire 0p = 1, is made we have that the wage
rate is given by:
w z = [0[B z   (I + R)A z] 1L z] 1 (2.7)
Substituting 2.7 into 2.6 we obtain the price vector
p z = [B z   (I + R)A z] 1L z[0[B z   (I + R)A z] 1L z] 1 (2.8)
The price vector p z is a function of the particular set of methods  z and
of the prot rates r11, r22, ..., rnn. Obviously these prices are not market
prices, but are auxiliary prices, that is prices that would allow the accounting
equilibrium between buyers and sellers of the factors of productions such
that the same production activity could take place during next production
cycle 5.
3 The Technological Frontier
Bruno (1969) has demonstrated an important dual relation between the
auxiliary prices and the methods of productions (and quantities, i.e., the
production possibility frontier). We can now attempt a measurement of
technological progress by comparing the prices associated with the employ-
ment of old methods with respect to the prices associated to the employment
of new ones. Equation 2.7 is meaningful only when the n prot rates, the
matrix R, are given explicit numerical values. A simplifying and meaning-
ful special case is the one in which the rates of prot are uniform so that
r = r11 = r22 = ::: = rnn. 6.
Equation 2.7 is then simplied into:
w z = [0[B z   A z(1 + r)] 1L z] 1 (3.1)
4On the origins of the non-substitution-theorem see Arrow (1951), Koopmans (1951),
Samuelson(1951). A more recent treatment is given in MasColell et al. (1995), pp.159-60.
See also Zambelli (2004).
5They can be interpreted in many dierent ways. They can be seen as: Adam Smith's
natural prices; Ricardo-Marx"s production prices; somewhat analogous to Seton's eigen-
prices; lomg term competitive equilibrium prices; Walrasian market clearing prices; shadow
prices and so on and so forth. In order not to attach to them any particular interpretation
we have chosen to refer to them as auxiliary prices
6Clearly there is a cloud of possible values that the individual prot rates could take
and that would guarantee a set of values for which the reproduction of the system could
take place. The choice of the uniform rate of proit nds its principlal justication from
the fact that it allows to work in a two dimensional space. In practice the graphical
representation of of the wage-prot rates frontier collapses from a n + 1 hyperspace to a
2 dimensional space
6where r = fr 2 Q : 0  r  Rg and R, the maximum rate of prot
.
w z = [0[B z   A z(1 + r)] 1L z] 1 (3.2)
where r = fr 2 Q : 0  r  R zg. Q is the set of rational numbers and R z
is the maximum rate of prot of system  z.
Although 3.2 is a well known relation its empirical importance may have
been somewhat underestimated. The above is the wage-prot curve. To
each combination of methods  z, there corresponds a wage-prot curve. The
outer envelope of all possible combinations of methods is the wage-prot
frontier.
The wage prot curves and frontiers are scale independent. This is a result
of the of the non-substitution theorem. Hence two dierent productive
systems, let us say the one associated with a small country and the
one associated with a big country, can be compared using the same
framework.
Comparison between two wage prot frontiers is independent of the cardi-
nality of they productive systems. Two systems which have dierent
cardinality, let us say n and m, can still be compared as long as they
have the same num eraire. The only requirement is that the num eraire
is a transformation based on the subset of commodities which are com-
mon to both systems.
The wage prots curve, 2.7 or 3.2, is dual with respect to the production
possibilities frontier 2.3. Clearly for a given set of prot rates if w
  z >
w z this means that the w
  z has, for the associated auxiliary prices, a
higher purchasing power with respect to w z. This is possible only if
the production possibilities frontier associated with the methods   z is
superior with respect to the production possibilities frontier associated
with the method  z.
All the possible linear combinations of two methods   z and  z will result in
a set of wage prot curves or frontiers which will be dominated either
by w
  z or by w z. This exstends to any subset of the methods in 
















r Fig. 3.1: The technological frontier
Clearly, not all the wage-prot curves associated to E contribute to the
formation of the technological frontier, w
TF
E . The subset of methods
of E which enters the frontier, E
TF, represents the most productive
system of methods, which is a combination of dierent sets. This is,
in our view, the composite bentchmark commodity to be used in order
to measure increases of productivity due to technological progress 7.
Whether the technological frontier, w
TF, is consistent with the neo-classical
framework or not will depend on the particular structure of the set of
methods. Hence this approch is general.
4 The Velupillai-Fredholm-Zambelli technological
frontier - Algorithm
The computation of the wage prot frontier is not a simple matter. There
exist a brute force algorithm which allows a precise computation of the w
TF
 .
But the implementation of this algorithm (see below) becomes computation-
ally intractable as the cardinality of the set of methods increases. However
7Velupillai and Zambelli (1993) is a rst search in this direction. Velupillai (1993, 5-6)
states: Production structures carry with them natural prices corresponding to particular
analytical assumptions about the economics of the production system. What is needed is
a device to extract these prices from the observed data of a functioning economy. Thus
the natural questions for the production approach relate to indices of productivity and
the optimality of price systems supporting production structures from particular economic
viewpoints. The measures encapsulate the price-mediated interaction between resource al-
location and income distribution for ecient production. The conceptional tools include
the optimal transformation frontier ...and the factor price frontier. The framework yields
eciency indices of dierent production systems and, by implication, real output compar-
isons between dierent economies. Constructing indices for these conceptual categories,
as remarked earlier, is the main task of this paper. That is the 1993 paper. We think that
this task, whose foundations were set in 1993 is fully completed in 'this' paper
8we have been able to a tractable algorithm that allows a drastic reduction of
the computational eort. For example with the cardinality of the data set
that we use in this paper, see below, the computation of w
TF
 with a desktop
computer and using the brute force algorithm would take several decades,
while the use of our algorithm allows its computation in just a few hours.
Given that we think that this is an important contribution of the present
paper we have taken the liberty of calling it the VFZ-algorithm which leads
to the computation of the VFZ-technological frontier which allows the com-
putation of two indices of technological progress: the VFZ-index and the
VFZ-rankings.
4.1 A brute-force algorithm
1. input data, i.e. individual input{output tables and organize it into the mul-
tiple dimension array,  (see equation 2.2)








3. compute sequentially, for j = 1 to s, the wage prot frontier, wzj 3.2 and
retain the value for wages w which dominates the previously computed wage








However, when using the above algorithm the computational complexity of
the problem implies that it is practicalyl impossible to compute the tech-
nological frontier for even small datasets, since for each rate of prot all
possible combinations of techniques must be evaluated. Using the Big-O
notation the time-complexity is (at least) O(s). This implies that no mat-
ter how powerful a computer that will be developed within, say the next
century, it will always be possible to include additional available data, such
that the algorithm will not halt within any reasonable time frame8.
4.2 The VFZ-algorithm and the VFZ-technological frontier
The computational complexity can however be drastically reduced (in the
order of s to s1=n) by exploiting an important result concerning switch
points. Bharadwaj (1970) has shown that:
i) "At a switch point the adjacent production system dier in the method of pro-
duction for only one of the commodities common to them (Bharadwaj, 1970,
p.423, emphasis added)";
8With N input-output tables, n sectors, the total number of systems, wage-prot fron-
tiers are N
n. The OECD input-output tables used below is formed of N = 64 tables with
n = 23 sectors, which means 64
23  3:5  10
41 unique systems. Running a whole year,
the computer must evaluate 1:1  10
34 systems per second, each including several matrix
operations. Not anything near such a computer exists today or will within any reasonable
time frame.
9ii) "The choice of the value unit [the num eraire] does not aect the maximum
number of switching possibilities [and their correspondence to the prot rate](
Bharadwaj, 1970, p.424)"
Using any point on any frontier the following procedure, so to say,
climbs the individual wage-prot frontiers using the switch points as step-
ping stones. This is how we reduce drastically the computational time.
1. import data and convert it into matrices of technical coecients
2. choose an initial point on any frontier
3. from this point, while r > 0, lower the prot rate one increment9 and compute
the wage rate without changing the techniques, save this as w
(a) one by one, change the techniques (piecemeal), i.e., n  (N   1) times,
and for each system
i. if the prot rate is smaller than the maximum prot rate, compute
the wage rates
ii. if this wage rate is greater than w, then we have passed a switch
point. Fix the new set of techniques and the associated wage rate.
Else use w
4. Now reverse the procedure, while w > 0, increase the prot rate one incre-
ment and compute the wage rate without changing the techniques, save this
as w
(a) one by one, change the techniques and for each system:
i. if the prot rate is smaller than the maximum prot rate, compute
the wage rates.
ii. if this wage rate is greater than w, then we have passed a switch
point. Fix the new set of techniques and the associated wage rate.
Else use w
5. go to point # 3 as long as loop # 3 and 4 do not produce identical results,
else terminate and collect the results
Both algorithms can be implemented with no serious demand for the avail-
able memory, but unlike the brute-force algorithm the VFZ-algorithm can-
not be run parallel.
An easy way to verify the outcome from the Piecemeal algorithm is to
apply the two algorithms on a tractable subset and check that they yield
identical results. This has been done with positive results.10
The full set of results based on the eight OECD countries for eight time
periods can be computed within a few hours, with the VFZ-algorithm using
a standard desktop computer.







number of switch point increased, which implies that the algorithm missed some switch
points. No changes in the results are found when narrowing the step-size to
1
2000.
10There exist one potential problem; it is theoretical possible, by some uke, that the
envelope is not connected by intersections with the initially chosen frontier. However, the
probability of this occurring tends to zero as the number of techniques tends to innity.
105 Two measures of technological progress based
on the VFZ-technological frontier
The VFZ-technological frontier can be used to measure the technological
progress and the relative economic performances of the dierent economic
systems, countries. We have constructed two dierent indices of perfor-
mance: the VFZ-index and the VFZ-ranking.
The VFZ-index measures the level of development as the ratio between
the system specic wage-prot curve and the VFZ-technological frontier.
The VFZ-index is dependent on the choice of the num eraire, but has the
advantage of assessing the degree of economic backwardness or forward-
ness in terms of the globally ecient production frontier captured by the
VFZ-technological frontier. In essence it is an assessment of the actual de-
velopment of the particular national system with respect to the benchmark
represented by the VFZ-technological frontier.
The VFZ-ranking computes the relative performances based on the con-
tribution of the economic systems to the formation of the ecient global
VFZ-technological frontier. As Bharadwaj (1969) has shown the switch
points of the wage-prot frontier are independent of the num eraire and
hence the contributions of the economic systems do not change with it. A
ranking between the dierent systems can be made by exploiting this fact.
Obviously an economic system that contribute substantially and more than
others to the formation of the VFZ-technological frontier can be consid-
ered as being forward in technological development with respect to those
not contributing at all. This does not mean that we have to expect that
the economic system necessarily performs better than others. Whether this
technological forwardness is actually exploited so as to assure, for example,
full employment level or high level of per-capita output or income is another
matter which is not discussed in this paper 11.
It has to be stressed that the VFZ-index is an 'absolute' measurement of
actual potential economic performance, while the VFZ-ranking is a 'relative'
measure of the access to more advanced, and potentially more productive,
industry level production methods. The computations of these two indices
require the computation of the VFZ-technological frontier. Hence, for the
reason explained above they have never been computed before.
11This becomes obvious when one considers the fact that to any wage-prot curve there
is associated an innity of re-proportioning or level of activities matrix X. Clearly, a
great variety of employment levels and per-capita incomes can be consistent with dierent
activity levels, X, it all depends on the actual structure and demand level of the regions
involved
115.1 The VFZ-index
Given a set of systems E (derived from combinations af the available meth-
ods, ), the VFZ-index provides a measure of the average eciency relative
to the VFZ-technological frontier , w
VFZ
E , associated to the subset.













j = 1;2;:::;N; t = 1;2;:::;T
where: ri = f0  ri  rm = R
VFZ
Et ;i = 1;:::;mg; R
VFZ
Et is the maximun rate
of prot of VFZ-technological frontier; m is the number of points of the rate
of prots domain of the VFZ-technological frontier w
VFZ
Et ;
The closer the index is to unity the more ecient is the technology used
in the single country relative to the theoretical maximum computed from
the entire set of production activities.
The advantages of the VFZ-index over conventional ones is:
1. The method is non-parametric and non-stochastic.
2. Technology, value, and aggregation are fully integrated through the
auxiliary prices, hence to some extend circumvents standard index
number and value problems.
3. The indices are time-invariant, i.e., they are fully determined within
single accounting period.12
4. The stability of the switch points greatly limits the sensitivity of
changes in the num eraire.
5. The interdependence among industries is endogenously captured by
changes in the prices of production.
6. The indices will not change as a consequence of simple changes in the
scale of production in the single industries, but only if real technolog-
ical innovations are observed in one or more industries.13
7. In the study of convergence, the benchmark/reference point is deter-
mined from the system as a whole and not simple a 'leading country'.
5.2 The VFZ-ranking
The VFZ-technological frontier is a piecemeal function formed with v inter-
vals, where for each interval a xed combination of methods,  z, holds. This
12However, updating the entire dataset with new data, say the 2010 OECD tables, will
almost certainly change the intertemporal technological frontier, but the within-period
ranking will remain unaected.
13By real technological innovations we mean changes in the matrix of technological
coecients and/or in the corresponding (normalised) vector of labour inputs.
12is independent of any num eraire. We have exploited this fact to construct a
num eraire-free index of performance. Our approach is to consider the level
of forwardness and of backwardness of economic regions to be related also
with respect to the contributions that the methods of the region give to the
formation of the global VFZ-technological frontier. Here it is not, as in the
case of the VFZ-index, the distrance with respect to the VFZ-technological
frontier that matters, but the actual number of methods belonging to a
region that contribute to the computation of the VFZ-technological frontier.
In order to take account also of methods that are not the most 'ecient'
ones, but that are almost as ecient as the most ecient, we have generated
a scheme in which methods can be ordered as being rst, second, third,
... and last (Nth). A method would be ranked second when the method
ranked rst is removed from the set of methods and it is the one that would
contribute to the new, and lower, VFZ-technological frontier 14 ; it would
be ranked third when the methods ranked rst and second are removed and
would contribute to the new VFZ-technological frontier and so on.
Once these rankings have been generated they are aggregated using the
Borda Counts weights (see for example Saari, 1985). That is the rst would
weighted with value 1, the second with value 1/2, the third with value 1/3
... the Nth with value 1/N. These values are used to determine the ranking
of the dierent regions by summing all the values associated to the methods
of the region. Clearly if the methods employed in a region are all superior
with respect to the others the highest value would be equal to the number
of commodities. Hence it is appropriate to normalize this value with respect
to the number of commodities, i.e industries or sectors. In this way the
highest possible performance value, as in the case of VFZ-index would be 1,
but in this case a high perfomance of one region would imply a much lower
performance of the other regions 15. This is not so in the case of VFZ-index.
This index has been called VFZ-ranking. Being totally independent form
the choice of the num eraire, we think that this is a very strong measure of
economic performance.
6 Data and the Choice of Num eraire
We study three versions of the VFZ-technological frontier; the contempo-
rary w
VFZ
CTF(ri;Et), the rolling w
VFZ
RTF(ri;E1 [ E2 [ ::: [ Et), the intertemporal
14Here we would like to stress that the calculations of a new VFZ-technological frontier
each time that a method is 'removed' would not be tractable if we had not found an
ecient way to compute it.
15In the very unlikely case in which a region dominates in all the industries the value
would be 1, in the case in which it would alwasys perform seconfd best, the value would
be 1/2, in the case in which all the industries would berform third best the value would
be 1/3 and so on.
13w
VFZ
ITF (ri;), where Et denotes the set of techniques used at time t and
E the total set of systems made from all the combinations of techniques
available. An obvious analytical property of these three versions of the





RTF(ri;E1 [ E2 [ ::: [ Et)  w
VFZ
ITF (ri;E) (6.1)
For the actual computation of the technological frontiers we have chosen
the OECD 1970{2005 input{output tables from the US, Germany, the UK,
France, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Australia. All based on the the ISIC
2 or ISIC 3 classications with respectively 35 and 48 industries.17 The
tables contain both the domestic interindustrial ow and industry-specic
imports of capital goods.
Some problems of comparability exist between the two methods of clas-
sication, but steps have been taken to minimize these problems. The initial
48 and 35 industries have been aggregated into 23 industries following stan-
dards of national accounting. The main reasons for doing so is that there are
dierences in the specic input-output tables due to dierent national sta-
tistical bureaus' practices. We think and hope that our aggregation furthers
comparability over time and across time 18.
Unfortunately, tables are not available for all countries for all time pe-
riods. To further increase comparability we have chosen to substitute the
missing tables with the most commensurable table, typically the table from
the previous accounting period in the same country. For details, see Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
As labour inputs we use data from the OECD on the industry-level 'com-
pensation of employees' and use this to distribute the total employment in
hours to the single industries. When available we use detailed industry-level
employment data from The Groningen Growth and Development Centre.19
There is a fundamental problem related to the units of accounting,
since the tables are denominated in current values of the national currency.
Macro-industry deators have been computed as the dierences between
macro-industry GDP denomination in respectively current and base period
prices, and used to deate the value denominated tables. This is probably
the best available proxy for the physical ow among industries found in the
OECD input{output tables. Appendix A contains additional information
on the data used.
16Since Et  fE1 [ E2::: [ Etg  fEg 8 t = 1;2;:::;T
17See www.OECD.org.
18We have investigated whether dierent aggregations would change the qualitative
results presented here. For aggregations that are consistent with the ISIC 2 or ISIC 3 in
the sense of aggragating 'neighbouring' industries we found that the qualitative results,
i.e. the relative positions, do not change signicantly
19See www.GGDC.net.
14As a num eraire we chose the vector of domestic net product of the USA
from the base year 2000 normalised with the total hours worked.
7 Eciency, Technological Change, and Conver-
gence
This analysis is both from a theoretical and empirical point of view 'aver-
age', as opposed to 'marginal', since it deals with average costs, returns,
revenues, etc. Given that marginal magnitudes can hardly be observed, but
average magnitudes can, the use of input-output tables is in our view very
appropriate.
A general problem associated with the measurement of technological
progress is due to the well known observation that dierent production ac-
tivities use dierent sets of factors of production. For example one can
consider the production of energy; nuclear energy, wind mills, hydro-power,
solar-energy, oil, coal, gas, etc. Without a robust measure of eciency, to
assess which production process is most ecient is almost always impossible.
There might be reasons dierent from technological superiority that may
lead to the adoption of a specic production structure. But the VFZ-
technological frontier, being the outer frontier of all possible combinations
of the methods of production of all the economic systems involved is a ro-
bust benchmark against which we measure the technological eciency of the
dierent individual regional or national systems.
7.1 The empirical technological frontiers
Figure 7.1 shows the complete collection of contemporary and rolling VFZ-
technological frontiers. Analogous to the study of the wage-prot curves
for the individual countries, an outward shift of the VFZ-technological fron-
tiers imply, in the context of the approach presented here, unambiguous
technological progress. Only in the case in which two wage-prot curves or
frontiers intersect, it cannot unambiguously be determined whether or not
a higher level of productivity for the whole system has been reached.20
The contemporary VFZ-technological frontiers, w
VFZ
CTF(ri;Et), show a clock-
wise and steady shift outwards, while the rolling VFZ-technological frontiers,
w
VFZ
RTF(ri;E1; E2;:::;Et), show a more parallel shift. This dierence provides
a rst-hand insight into the nature of the global technological progress. Here
20It is not always the case that the adoption of a new method indicates that the method
is superior, simply because its evaluation in terms of cost-benets would depend on the
adoption of the methods of the other industries. Furthermore, both the market prices and
the auxiliary prices do depend on the methods used for the whole system (and other very
important contingent factors).
15we can interpret the clockwise shifts of the contemporary technological fron-
tiers as a global labour-saving technological progress. Since the value of the
circulating capital does not necessarily change monotonically with the prot
rate, this interpretation is not fully unambiguous.
In the context of this paper we assume, following standard practices, that
the index numbers representing the inputs and the output do represent the
same class of commodities. As time evolves new combinations of inputs do
allow the production of the outputs. The complexity of interactions is very
high and hence it is not at all clear that a particular combination would
be ecient when inserted in a dierent context where other methods are
used for the production of other commodities. The production structure
of a national system is the result of a complex set of events and hence a
particular combination of inputs used in the past may not be realized at
a later point in time. The rolling technological frontier w
VFZ
RTF does capture
technological progress. This is particularly so when the relation between
inputs and output is considered as a method of production.
The problem of intersection(s) between frontiers does not exist for the
rolling technological frontier, since these by construction will never intersect.
Consequently, together with the other frontiers, this property makes the
rolling technological frontier a strong analytical tool.
Fig. 7.1: The contemporary, w
VFZ




An observed dierence between the contemporary and rolling frontiers
implies that there exist some combinations of the old and new production
techniques, which are more productive than all combinations of the tech-
16niques currently used.21.
Fig. 7.2: Contemporary, rolling and country specic wage-
prots technological frontiers: 1970{1985
Figure 7.2 and 7.3 show the wage-prot curves for the individual coun-
tries together with the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers. Fig-
ure 7.2 for the period 1970{1985 and Figure 7.3 for 1990{2005. As expected
the US is the leading country from the 1970s, but the US wage-prot fron-
tiers do not shift as much as the other countries' frontiers in the 1970s, i.e.,
evidence of a slowdown in the US and catching up by the other countries.22
See also Figure B.2 and B.3 in the statistical companion, where the frontiers
are presented country-by-country.
21However, it could be argued that some old techniques of production should be dis-
carded from the set of techniques forming the rolling (and inter-temporal) technological
frontier. These could be techniques that are both (under some circumstances) superior
to contemporary techniques, but practically obsolete. And hence de facto no longer exist
in the book of available blueprints. But this type of analysis, although very relevant, goes
beyond the scope of the present study
22See Degasperi and Fredholm (2010) for a discussion of the US productivity slowdown.
17Fig. 7.3: Contemporary, rolling and country specic wage-
prots technological frontiers: 1990{2005
7.2 The VFZ-index applied to the OECD input-output data
set
The values of the VFZ-index computed for the eight countries and the econ-
omy as a whole are collected in Tables23 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 . Table 7.1 re-
ports the values of the VFZ-index when the benchmark is the contemporary
wage-prot frontier, w
VFZ
CTF(ri;Et) . Clearly, as shown also in the gures of
the previous section, the contemporary wage-prot frontier evolves through
time. Particularly interesting is the stable values exhibited by the United
States that, for the whole sample period, maintain a value between 0.66 and
0.69. Meanwhile Germany, France and Denmark, which started at a much
lower level, in the twenty years going from 1970 to 1990-95 have reached
the United States levels. Germany has gone from 0.37 to 0.64; France from
0.52 to 0.70; Denmark from 0.43 to 0.67. Other countries, according to the
results presented here, have moved slowly upward, but far from exhibiting
a clear catching up. Particularly interesting is also the observation that for
the period going from 1995 to 2005 it is only the United States (and at a
lower level Canada) that keeps the same distance with respect to the con-
temporary technological frontier: all the other countries fall. This does also
indicate the technological development could have been driven, in the recent
23The values inside brackets of these table are relative to missing input-output tables,
they are computed anyway using the method described in Appendix A
18past and to a large extent, by the United States.
This observation is conrmed when we measure the country perfor-
mances having as benchmark the inter-temporal technological frontier, w
VFZ
ITF
(ri;E), see Table 7.3. The VFZ-index for the United States shows that
throughout the 80s the United States have shown no sign of technological
development, a minor improvement is observed from 1985 to 1995, but the
real expansion is captured by the sharp increase exhibited from 1995 to 2005:
jumping from 0.39 (1995) to 0.49 (2005).
The last row of Table 7.3 reports the measure of distance to the inter-
temporal VFZ-technological frontier of the contemporary technological fron-
tier. From this index it is clear that the technological progress has taken
place in two jumps: the rst from 1980 to 1985 (going from 0.47 to 0.55) and
the second from 1995 to 2000 (going from 0.56 to 0.64). While the technolog-
ical progress observed from 1980 to 1985 was paralleled by all the countries
with improvements of similar magnitudes, the jump observed from 1995 to
2000 is to be attributed principally to the United States (and Canada).
When we analyze the data reported in Table 7.3 we observe that the
contemporary technological frontier has, for the period going from 1970
to 2005, increased from 0.45 to 0.66. This corresponds to a compounded
growth rate of 1.1 percent per year, which is far less than the often reported
1.5{2 percent. Over a period of 35 years the dierence between a growth
rate of 1.1 and 2.0 percent corresponds to an increase of a factor 1.5 and 2,
respectively.
For the single countries the dierence between the level of 1970 and 2005
corresponds to a compounded growth rate of: the US 1.0, Germany 1.2, the
UK 2.0, France 1.2, Canada 1.5, Denmark 1.4 and Australia 2.1 percent per
year, these growth rates are surprisingly small. Especially, the 1.0 percent
annual growth for US. 24
If these results | as here implicitly claimed | provide an alternative
measure with respect to the usual indices of technological progress, then
they are indeed interesting.
An interesting point is that the US - as well as the other countries - seem
not to be facing a technology constraint. The distance between the actual
economic structures and the VFZ-technological frontier is noticeable. Nat-
urally, this depends on the availability of the foreign production techniques.
Some techniques might be country-specic, i.e, cannot be transferred; a
great deal will probably not be transferable, but internal to multinational
24The OECD data bank does not report all the input-output tables. Appendix A
contains additional information on the data used. With respect to Japan, we have found
a great gap between the input-output tables available before 1995 and those available
starting from 1995. We consider the values computed up to 1990 to be unreliable, and
hence its value is here not reported. It must also be noted that between 1990 and 1995 the
input{output tables change from the ISIC 2 to the present ISIC 3 standard of accounting.
Whether or not this greatly inuence our results is pro tempore unknown.









0:68 0:69 0:68 0:66 0:67 0:66 0:69 0:68
(0:37) (0:36) 0:36 0:39 0:43 0:64 0:59 0:57
0:32 (0:44) 0:43 0:43 0:41 0:48 0:47 0:46
(0:52) 0:51 0:55 0:60 0:70 0:67 0:63 0:58
0:42 0:44 0:43 0:44 0:42 0:51 0:54 0:50
(0:43) 0:43 0:38 0:46 0:54 0:67 0:62 0:49
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: 0:54 0:35 0:45
0:29 0:40 0:39 0:42 0:50 0:48 0:44 0:42
Table 7.1: The VFZ-index values: Contemporary, w
VFZ
CTF(ri;Et)









1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1
(5) (7) 7:00 7:00 5:00 4:00 4:00 3:00
6:00 (4) 4:00 5:00 7:00 8:00 6:00 6:00
(2) 2:00 2:00 2:00 1:00 1:00 2:00 2:00
4:00 3:00 3:00 4:00 6:00 6:00 5:00 4:00
(3) 5:00 6:00 3:00 3:00 2:00 3:00 5:00
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: 5:00 8:00 7:00
7:00 6:00 5:00 6:00 4:00 7:00 7:00 8:00














0:32 0:33 0:32 0:36 0:38 0:39 0:46 0:49
(0:16) (0:16) 0:16 0:20 0:24 0:38 0:39 0:41
0:15 (0:20) 0:20 0:23 0:23 0:28 0:31 0:34
(0:24) 0:24 0:26 0:33 0:40 0:40 0:42 0:41
0:20 0:21 0:21 0:23 0:24 0:30 0:36 0:36
(0:20) 0:20 0:18 0:24 0:31 0:40 0:41 0:35
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: 0:32 0:23 0:32
0:13 0:19 0:19 0:23 0:29 0:29 0:29 0:30
0:45 0:48 0:47 0:55 0:57 0:56 0:64 0:66













1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 2:00 3:00 1:00 1:00
(5) (7) 7:00 7:00 6:00 4:00 4:00 3:00
6 (4) 4:00 5:00 7:00 8:00 6:00 6:00
(2) 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
4 3 3 4 5 6 5 4
(3) 5 6 3 3 1 3 5
::: 5 8 7
7 6 5 6 4 7 7 8
Table 7.4: The VFZ-index positions: Benchmark, Inter-
temporal VFZ-technological frontier, w
VFZ
ITF (ri;)
corporations, which at least limits the transferability; and some (if not most)
production techniques require a great deal of human capital which in one
way or another also must be transferred. In any case, we observe that the
US - as well as the other countries - from the 1980s has been approaching the
inter-temporal technological frontier, but also that there is, still potentially,
a long way to go 26.
The same goes for Germany and Denmark. While the UK and Australia
remain behind.
7.3 The VFZ-ranking applied to the OECD input-output
data set
The VFZ-ranking is a num eraire free measure of performance. As explained
above, subsection 5.2 being a measurement of the performance of the in-
dividual industries in terms of rst, second and n-th best contributions to
the formation of the VFZ-technological frontier, it is not a measure of the
actual state of the implementation of the technological progress, which is
captured by the VFZ-index discussed in the previous section, but does mea-
sure the contribution of the economic region with respect to the formation of
the most ecient global outer frontier represented by the VFZ-technological
frontier, w
VFZ
CTF(ri;Et). It is also a concise measure of the relative position of
the regions. A sure 'winning' region is the one which contributes-dominates
all the others because the methods of production for each sector dominates
26Particularly striking is the very low position of the actual wage-prot frontier of
Japan. For the year 2000 it was the worst in terms of the wage-prot frontier and for
the year 2005 only Australia had an actual wage-prot frontier that was lower than that
of Japan. In terms of technological progress we have that the VFZ-index measures the
actual technological progress, while the VFZ-rankings the relative position with respect
the potential contribution to the worldwide potential frontier of production. As we will
see below, for the year 2005, Japan performs in 2005 rather poorly, but second in the
relative positions
21the methods of all the other regions. This case of total dominance would
mean that the value of the VFZ-ranking would be 1.
This being the case the highest possible VFZ-ranking for the second
region, where all the methods of this region are second best, would be 1/2.
This being the case the highest possible value for the VFZ-ranking for the
country performing third-best would be 1/3 and so on. Clearly what just
described is a case of perfect relative dominant ordering. But the situation is
rarely clear cut and the VFZ-ranking values are weighted averages. A value
between 1 and 1/2 means that on the average the methods are between being
rst best and second best, a value between 1/2 and 1/3 between second and
third best and so on.
The VFZ-index is useful in order to assess the actual development of an
economic region, but, as explained above, the VFZ-ranking does indicate
the degree of technological forwardness or backwardness in terms of the
importance of the individual industries.
From the values reported in Table 7.5 and the relative positions,Table
7.6, with respect to the VFZ-rankings we can conclude that Canada has
experienced a remarkable fall in the level of technological progress, going
from 0.6 in 1970 and falling to 0.36 in 1995. Although Canada remains above
average the loss in position is noticeable. The US has experienced from the
70s to the whole 90s a fall in the technological performance. But has kept
an important relative position as second best. It is only in the years 2000
and 2005 that the United States does express unambiguous leadership. The
VFZ-ranking relative to 2000 is back to the levels shown in 1970. Contrary
to what one would expect, Germany does exhibit a modest performance in
both the VFZ-ranking values (Table 7.5) and relative position (Table 7.6).
Particularly striking is also the poor performance of the UK and Aus-
tralia. Clearly, given that the VFZ-ranking is a measurement of relative
performance we have that for as given year high values for one region imply
low levels for the others and hence there must be some which exhibit relative
backwardness. This result, also compared with the values of the VFZ-index
does indicate a problematic performance. Another interesting result is the
fact that France, which was performing well in terms of the VFZ-index in
the case of the VFZ-ranking is not performing as well. This can be in-
terpreted as a well balanced domestic interdependent production structure.
In particular France has reached a leadership role in 1990, role overtaken
by Denmark in 1995. An inspection to the VFZ-ranking of 1990 and 1995
shows that all countries were performing rather poorly - or alternatively -
that there was not a clear indication of leadership. When we compare the
VZF-ranking yearly highest values we see that the leader of 1990 (France,
0.48) and of 1995 (Denmark, 0.45) are those having the lowest VFZ-ranking
27.
271970 Canada 0.6, 1975 Canada 0.58, 1980 Canada 0.52, 1985 Canada 0.52, 1990 France









0:50 0:45 0:44 0:43 0:41 0:42 0:53 0:51
(0:38) (0:37) 0:39 0:35 0:30 0:32 0:31 0:31
0:18 (0:24) 0:23 0:25 0:23 0:20 0:29 0:28
(0:35) 0:34 0:35 0:41 0:48 0:31 0:29 0:32
0:60 0:58 0:52 0:52 0:47 0:36 0:40 0:37
(0:32) 0:31 0:35 0:38 0:39 0:45 0:37 0:30
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: 0:35 0:28 0:39
0:24 0:31 (0:31) 0:24 0:31 0:30 0:24 0:24
Table 7.5: The VFZ-ranking values









2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1
(3) (3) 3 5 6 5 4 5
7 (7) 7 6 7 8 6 7
(4) 4 4 3 1 6 5 4
1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3
(5) 6 5 4 4 1 3 6
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: 4 7 2
6 5 6 7 5 7 8 8
Table 7.6: The VFZ-ranking values. Relative positions
7.4 Single industry contributions to the formation of the
VFZ-technological frontier
Figure 7.4 shows the (unweighted) average industry-level frequency of the
single countries contribution to the contemporary and rolling technological
frontiers.
Even though the US is considered the leading country, it is only in few
cases the country that is contributing most to the technological frontiers (in-
cluding the inter-temporal which is the rightmost of the rolling frontiers).
This indicates that the US in a few industries strongly dominates, i.e., all
or most segments of the envelope include a particular US technique, and
that these industries must play a vital role for the economy as a whole. By
inspecting Figures B.4{B.26 for the single industries in the statistical com-
panion, it is found that the US dominates in 'Construction'; 'Machinery and
equipment, nec'; and 'Business activities (nance, real estate, and R&D)'.
Together with Germany the US also dominates in 'Manufacturing, nec'. Ger-
many dominates in 'Electrical machinery and apparatus'; 'Transport equip-
ment'; and 'Manufacturing nec; recycling (include Furniture)'. Canada in
'Other non-metallic mineral products'; 'Metals'; 'Fabricated metal products,
0.47, 1995 Denmark 0.45, 2000 United States 0.53, 2005 United States 0.51
23Fig. 7.4: The composition of the contemporary and rolling tech-
nological frontiers
except machinery and equipment'. Denmark, however insignicant on the
world marked, dominates in 'Mining and quarrying' and 'Food products,
beverages, and tobacco'.
An important general point is that no country at a single point in time
dominates the entire technological frontier (contemporary or rolling). Hence,
all countries could, at any point in time, potentially gain from further global
integration, either through increased trade or transfer of production tech-
niques (including human capital) or that there are additional potential gains
from specialization due to potential comparative advantages.
The statistical companion contains detailed empirical evidence on the
country/industry specic contributions to the dierent technological fron-
tiers. From these results it is possible to go deeper into an analysis of the
displacement of the production techniques over time. In particular, it would
be interesting to study the dierence between the displacement of techniques
in the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers, since this can tell
us to what extent new more productive techniques have been introduced as
oppose to new combinations of old techniques of production.
8 A summing up: technological progress and catch-
ing up
The value-added of this paper is the discovery of the VFZ-algorithm, see
section 4, which allows the computing of actual technological frontiers from
huge collections of production techniques. This is done without going through
24stochastic ad hoc and hence unsatisfactory short cuts. This is an important
breakthrough that allows the computation of powerful measures of systemic
technological progress.
An important property of the wage-prot frontiers and consequently also
of the the VFZ-technological frontier is that they are scale independent, see
section 2, page 6. This means that the performance of small economic
regions as well as of big ones can all be measured with the same method.
Based on this powerful tool, we have tried to develop synthetic indices
of economic progress: the VFZ-index and the VFZ-ranking. These indices
are useful to measure the intra-temporal economic progress and the inter-
temporal technological development.
Here we have applied these new tools to the OECD input-output data
so as to measure the performance of 8 leading countries for the period going
from 1970 to 2005. We can conclude the following:
1. The global technological progress has been, for the period considered,
around 1.1% per year.
2. This evolution can be divided into two periods (see Table 7.3, p.20):
(a) Catching-up. Period 1970-1995, characterized by a low global
overall technological progress, 0.88:%
i. During this period the United States have maintained the
high technological level reached at the beginning of the pe-
riod, 1970, but with a very low growth rate, 0.79%;
ii. Practically all the countries have converged towards the United
States level;
A. A set of countries have, by the year 1995, reached the
United States levels: Germany (6% growth rate) ; France
(2.6% growth rate); Denmark (2.8% growth rate );
B. Another set of countries have exhibited catching-up, but
has never reached the United States levels: Canada (2%
growth rate) has in 1995 reached a VFZ-index value of
0.3 while the US had 0.39; United Kingdom (2.5% growth
rate) has in 1995 reached a VFZ-index value of 0.28 while
the US had 0.39; Japan has in 1995 reached a VFZ-index
value of 0.32 while the US had 0.3928; Australia (3.3%
growth rate) has in 1995 reached a VFZ-index value of
0.29 while the US had 0.39 .
(b) Restart. Period 1995-2005, characterized with higher technolog-
ical progress, 2% ;
28As mentioned above, the data for Japan antecedent the period 1995-2005 seems to be
somewhat awed and hence it is here not considered in terms of its rate of growth
25i. During these years, after having kept for a long period the
position gained 25 years before, the United States have ex-
hibited a sustained growth where the VFZ-index has gone
from the 1995 level of 0.39 to the 2005 level of 0.49, implying
a rate of growth of 2.3%;
ii. A clear indication of leadership his shown also by the United
States high value of the VFZ-ranking; the values for the years
2000 and 2005 are above the already high value of 1970 (see
Table 7.5, p.23);
iii. Apart from Canada, which has continued in catching-up, all
the other countries have remained in 2005 at the same level as
they had in 1995 and in one case, Denmark, it has exhibited
a denite and sharp fall.
3. An inspection of VFZ-index values of Table 7.1 p.20 where the bench-
mark is the contemporary VFZ-technological frontier and of the values
of Table 7.3, p.20, where the benchmark is the inter-temporal VFZ-
technological frontier indicate that although there is a clear leadership
in technological progress, it is also the case that the wage-prot curves
of the individual countries are substantially below the global wage-
prot frontiers. Hence it seems that there is scope for improvements.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a computationally ecient algorithm - the
VFZ-algorithm - that allows the computation of the ecient wage-prot
frontier, here called the VFZ-technological frontier. As shown the VFZ-
technological frontier is a theoretical construction that, due to duality prop-
erties, can be used to measure technological progress in terms of the changes
of these auxiliary prices. Once the computation of VFZ-technological fron-
tier, was made tractable it has been straightforward to dene two impor-
tant measures of technological performance, the VFZ-index and the VFZ-
ranking.
We have applied the above tools to the OECD input-output data bank.
This has led to important empirical results which we have summarized in the
previous section. The results appear interesting and somewhat illuminating
and a review comparing results from other studies could be useful.
Another important direction to be investigated further is the compar-
ison of the productivity of the dierent sectors that can be conducted by
extracting information with respect to the auxiliary prices associated to it.
An interesting characteristic of the method used here is that the prices are
all measured in terms of the per-capita Net National Product of the United
States, year 2000, but their values vary as a function of the specic individual
26local structures. Hence, the virtual purchasing power (or virtual exchange
values) of the commodities produced in one system might be very dierent
form the values produced in another system. This information can be used
further to measure the sectoral technological progress. Further research on
this direction would be necessary and, we think, very rewarding. A similar
attempt has been made, 25 years ago, by Wassily Leontief (1985) himself.
Thanks to the algorithms available and constructed for this paper we are
condent that interesting results would emerge.
Related with the above there is also the issue connected with the dier-
ence that there is between actual market prices and our virtual prices. As
we have pointed out in Section 2 the assumption of a uniform rate of prot,
although very standard, is convenient assumption that allows us to work
with a simple two dimensional space - instead of an n-dimensional one.
Furthermore, the VFZ-technological frontier can be seen as a tool for
the study of comparative and absolute advantages. This too would be the
scope for further research.
A last word. The VFZ-algorithm does exploit an important result found
in Bharadwaj (1970). That paper was written as a contribution to what
is often considered an important, but maybe useless, theoretical eld: cap-
ital theory. To be able to use the result presented there for an empirical
application is a further element in support of pure theory. Whether a the-
oretical result might or might not have a practical application cannot be
determined a priori. We hope that this paper is a further example of a use-
ful, but unexpected and hence not programmable, link between pure theory
and applications.
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28A Data Description
Table A.1 shows which OECD input{output tables that are available from
the period 1970{2005. Tables are not necessarily available from the exact ve

































































Table A.1: Available input{output tables
year intervals, e.g., the US tables here labelled 1970 and 1975 are actually
the 1972 and 1977 tables, respectively.29
The list below shows how the original tables have been aggregated down
to the 2323 used in this study. The numbers in the brackets refer to their
respective ISIC 2 and ISIC 3 classication, viz. f[ISIC 3],[ISIC 2]g.
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and shing f[1],[1]g
2. Mining and quarrying f[2{3],[2]g
3. Food products, beverages, and tobacco f[4],[3]g
4. Textiles, textile products, leather, and footwear f[5],[4]g
5. Wood and products of wood and cork f[6],[5]g
6. Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing f[7],[6]g
7. Coke, rened petroleum products, and nuclear fuel f[8],[9]g
8. Chemicals f[9{10],[7{8]g
9. Rubber and plastics products f[11],[10]g
10. Other non-metallic mineral products f[12],[11]g
11. Metals f[13{14],[12{13]g
12. Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment f[15],[14]g
13. Machinery and equipment, nec f[16],[15]g
14. Electrical machinery and apparatus f[17{20],[16{18]g
15. Transport equipment f[21{25],[19{22]g
16. Manufacturing nec; recycling (include furniture) f[25],[23{24]g
17. Production and distribution of electricity, gas, and water f[26{29],[25]g
18. Construction f[30],[26]g
19. Wholesale and retail trade f[31],[27]g
20. Service activities (transport, hotels and restaurants) f[32{36],[28{29]g
21. Post and telecommunications f[37],[30]g
22. Business activities (nance, real estate, and R&D) f[38{43],[31{32]g
23. Public administration, education and health f[44{48],[33{35]g
29The full list of available tables are: the US f1972, 1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005g, Germany f1978, 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005g, the UK f1968, 1979, 1984, 1990,
1995, 2000, 2003g, France f1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005g, Canada f1971,
1976, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000g, Denmark f1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004g,
Japan f1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005g, and Australia f1968, 1974, 1986,
1989, 1999 ,2005g.
29Table A.2{A.9 show the macro-industry deators used to convert the ta-
bles denominated in current prices (possible domestic currency) into tables
denominated in xed US 2000 prices. The transition to the EURO has
been taken into account in the tables below. The deators are computed as
the ratio between GDP in constant prices and GDP in current prices and
when necessary also divided by the dollar-domestic currency exchange rate
(www.sourceoecd.org). The missing values marked with a ' ' correspond
with the unavailable OECD tables.






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
1:23 0:84 0:71 0:74 0:65 0:67 1:00 0:91
2:83 1:89 1:14 1:09 1:02 0:96 1:00 0:93
4:97 3:28 2:03 1:79 1:43 1:26 1:00 0:71
2:13 1:53 1:12 1:05 0:97 0:87 1:00 0:98
4:79 3:45 2:34 1:88 1:47 1:23 1:00 0:88
5:15 3:57 2:37 1:98 1:53 1:24 1:00 0:82
Table A.2: Macro-industry deators for the US 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
    0:53 0:60 0:64 1:00 1:03 1:39
    0:81 0:60 0:57 1:02 1:03 1:01
    1:15 0:84 0:71 1:02 1:03 0:98
    0:78 0:63 0:60 1:01 1:03 1:03
    1:01 0:69 0:61 1:02 1:03 0:94
    0:98 0:75 0:67 1:08 1:03 0:97
Table A.3: Macro-industry deators for Germany 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
5:97   2:26 2:43 1:40 1:06 1:57 1:37
11:3   3:65 2:21 1:86 1:64 1:57 1:57
18:4   4:44 3:14 2:15 2:00 1:57 1:35
13:2   4:41 2:87 1:91 1:72 1:57 1:51
14:8   4:50 2:87 2:01 1:71 1:57 1:34
21:5   5:81 3:84 2:33 1:94 1:57 1:38
Table A.4: Macro-industry deators for the UK 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
  0:25 0:23 0:17 0:15 0:98 1:06 1:09
  0:34 0:26 0:17 0:16 1:04 1:06 1:12
  0:56 0:38 0:26 0:21 1:19 1:06 0:86
  0:39 0:30 0:20 0:17 1:05 1:06 0:95
  0:53 0:42 0:29 0:22 1:22 1:06 0:94
  0:58 0:41 0:26 0:21 1:18 1:06 0:91
Table A.5: Macro-industry deators for France 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
3:53 1:63 1:00 0:96 0:95 0:78 0:81  
3:95 2:37 1:38 1:18 1:04 0:94 0:81  
3:33 1:89 1:31 1:18 0:92 0:87 0:81  
2:63 1:76 1:20 0:96 0:85 0:82 0:81  
4:26 2:50 1:58 1:17 0:94 0:87 0:81  
4:40 2:58 1:71 1:29 1:02 0:90 0:81  
Table A.6: Macro-industry deators for Canada 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
  :104 :094 :074 :078 :101 :119 :143
  :305 :246 :178 :149 :140 :119 :113
  :360 :290 :222 :173 :147 :119 :104
  :244 :210 :134 :120 :117 :119 :109
  :329 :253 :179 :150 :128 :119 :109
  :360 :285 :197 :151 :136 :119 :103
Table A.7: Macro-industry deators for Denmark 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
:0135 :0083 :0067 :0063 :0060 :0056 :0065 :0071
:0111 :0078 :0063 :0058 :0058 :0059 :0065 :0074
:0313 :0152 :0104 :0087 :0073 :0066 :0065 :0066
:0123 :0082 :0067 :0062 :0062 :0061 :0065 :0068
:0177 :0119 :0091 :0078 :0069 :0064 :0065 :0068
:0288 :0137 :0104 :0086 :0075 :0066 :0065 :0067
Table A.8: Macro-industry deators for Japan 1970{2005






IV Wholesale and retail
trade, repairs; hotels and
restaurants; transport
V Financial intermediation;
real estate, business activities
VI Other service activities
3:32 2:09   0:98 0:73   0:88 0:75
3:78 2:76   0:94 0:88   0:80 0:55
4:45 2:72   1:05 0:88   0:77 0:65
5:35 3:42   1:02 0:84   0:77 0:69
7:30 4:98   1:34 0:99   0:80 0:65
5:04 2:96   1:20 1:01   0:79 0:61
Table A.9: Macro-industry deators for Australia 1970{2005
31B Additional Results
B.1 The Wage-prot and Intertemporal Technological Fron-
tiers
Figure B.1 shows the wage-prot frontiers forming the intertemporal tech-
nological frontier, and Figure B.2 and B.3 show the wage-prot frontiers
for the individual countries together with the intertemporal technological
frontier.
Fig. B.1: The intertemporal technological frontier
32Fig. B.2: Wage-prot frontiers and the intertemporal techno-
logical frontier: the US, Germany, the UK, and
France
Fig. B.3: Wage-prot frontiers and the intertemporal techno-
logical frontier: Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Aus-
tralia
33B.2 Industrylevel Frequency of the Single Countries Contri-
bution to the Contemporary Technological Frontiers
The following 23 gures show the industry-level frequency of the single coun-
tries contribution to the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers.
Fig. B.4: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and shing
Fig. B.5: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Mining and quarrying
34Fig. B.6: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Food products, beverages, and tobacco
Fig. B.7: Countries and industry specic contributions to the
contemporary and rolling technological frontiers, Tex-
tiles, textile products, leather, and footwear
35Fig. B.8: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Wood and products of wood and cork
Fig. B.9: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing
36Fig. B.10: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Coke, rened petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
Fig. B.11: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Chemicals
37Fig. B.12: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Rubber and plastics products
Fig. B.13: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Other non-metallic mineral products
38Fig. B.14: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Metals
Fig. B.15: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment
39Fig. B.16: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Machinery and equipment, nec
Fig. B.17: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Electrical machinery and apparatus
40Fig. B.18: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Transport equipment
Fig. B.19: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Manufacturing nec; recycling (include Furniture)
41Fig. B.20: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Production and distribution of electricity, gas, and
water
Fig. B.21: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Construction
42Fig. B.22: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Wholesale and retail trade
Fig. B.23: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Service activities (transport, hotels and restaurants)
43Fig. B.24: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Post and telecommunications
Fig. B.25: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Business activities (nance, real estate, and R&D)
44Fig. B.26: Countries and industry specic contributions to
the contemporary and rolling technological frontiers,
Public administration, education and health
B.3 Country Specic Contributions to the Contemporary
and Rolling Technological Frontiers
The following 8 gures show the country specic contributions to the con-
temporary and rolling technological frontiers. The maximum value is equal
to the number of industries, 23, and would imply that the given country's
wage-prot frontier coincided with the technological frontier.
Fig. B.27: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, the US
45Fig. B.28: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Germany
Fig. B.29: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, the UK
46Fig. B.30: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, France
Fig. B.31: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Canada
47Fig. B.32: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Denmark
Fig. B.33: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Japan
48Fig. B.34: Country specic contributions to the contemporary
technological frontiers, Australia
49